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A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction could potentially make a gain from taking
actions that are detrimental to the other party in the transaction. This paper examines the economics
of conflicts of interest in financial institutions and reviews the growing empirical literature (mostly
focused on analysts) on the economic implications of these conflicts. Economic analysis shows that,
although conflicts of interest are omnipresent when contracting is costly and parties are imperfectly
informed, there are important factors that mitigate their impact and, strikingly, it is possible for customers
of financial institutions to benefit from the existence of such conflicts. The empirical literature reaches
conclusions that differ across types of conflicts of interest, but overall these conclusions are more ambivalent
and certainly more benign than the conclusions drawn by journalists and politicians from mostly anecdotal
evidence. Though much has been made of conflicts of interest arising from investment banking activities,
there is no consensus in the empirical literature supporting the view that conflicts resulting from these
activities had a systematic adverse impact on customers of financial institutions.
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Since the turn of the century, much attention has been focused on conflicts of interest in the 
financial industry. A Google search (July 2006) for “conflict of interest” has more than one 
hundred and fifty million hits. The front pages of major newspapers and the evening news 
discussed conflicts of interest. Politicians held hearings and made speeches. Lawsuits were filed 
by the bushel. Laws and regulations were changed. Books were written. The Financial Times 
summarized public sentiment with the headline “Shoot all the analysts”.
1 No event symbolizes 
this attention better than the Global Settlement reached on April 28, 2003 between the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD), the 
New York State attorney, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and state regulatory agencies 
on the one hand, and ten of the most prominent financial institutions on the other hand.
2 The 
Global Settlement imposed penalties of more than $1.4 billion on these institutions and required 
them to agree to practices presumed to limit the impact of conflicts of interest on securities 
research.  
For economists, the recent attention paid to conflicts of interest in the financial industry raises 
many questions. Do the many mechanisms that control conflicts of interest in market economies 
fail to do so? If these mechanisms fail, does it mean that the conflicts have significant 
implications for the prices at which securities trade? For the efficiency of capital markets? For the 
welfare of customers of financial institutions? Were conflicts worse at the turn of the century than 
at other times? If they were, why? Does diversification of activities within financial institutions 
make conflicts of interest worse or better? Did attempts to affect the impact of conflicts of interest 
through changes in laws and regulations make the customers of financial institutions better off? 
Did these changes have unintended consequences that made U.S. capital markets less efficient 
and less competitive? 
                                                 
1 Cited in Boni and Womack (2002). 
2 Two additional institutions joined the agreement in 2004.   
3 
In this paper, we define a conflict of interest as a situation where a party to a transaction 
could potentially make a direct gain by taking actions that affect the other party adversely. For 
example, in the context of sell-side analysts, a conflict of interest would arise if a financial 
institution were to obtain a direct advantage, for instance, potential underwriting fees, from 
offering biased research about a firm to customers of its analyst services.
3 Some authors use a 
much narrower definition of conflicts of interest. In particular, some define conflicts of interests 
as situations in which a party with a fiduciary duty takes actions that are inconsistent with that 
fiduciary duty.
4 Such a definition is not useful for economic analysis because it presumes that the 
existence of incentives to take actions that are inconsistent with a fiduciary duty automatically 
leads the fiduciary to take such actions. This is clearly not the case. Another definition assumes 
that conflicts of interest arise if one party is somehow in a position of trust.
5 This definition again 
seems too limiting. If one party provides a service to another, is it really clear when the provider 
is in a position of trust and when she is not?  
The existence of a conflict of interest within a financial institution does not mean that, in 
equilibrium, the conflict will have an adverse impact on the customers of financial institutions. 
Using analysts as an example, the existence of conflicts could lead institutions to provide better 
forecasts so that customers benefit. Perhaps more importantly, many mechanisms help control 
conflicts of interest and their impact. For instance, a financial institution’s concerns about its 
reputation might lead it to control conflicts of interest so that they have no material impact on its 
customers. Further, even if conflicts of interest affect the actions of financial institutions, they 
may not hurt their customers because these customers can rationally take into account how these 
                                                 
3 Sell-side analysts are analysts who typically work for brokerage firms. Buy-side analysts work for 
institutional investors. In this paper, we focus almost exclusively on sell-side analysts. Consequently, we do 
not make a distinction between both types of analysts in the rest of the paper and use the term analyst to 
designate a sell-side analyst.  
4 West’s Encyclopedia of American Law defines conflicts of interest as “A term used to describe the 
situation in which a public official or fiduciary who, contrary to the obligation and absolute duty to act for 
the benefit of the public or a designated individual, exploits the relationship for personal benefit, typically 
pecuniary.” 
5 The on-line version of the Merriam-Webster dictionary has the following definition: “a conflict between 
the private interests and the official responsibilities of a person in a position of trust”.  
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conflicts affect what financial institutions do. It follows from this discussion that even though one 
party could make a potential gain from taking actions that affect the other party in a transaction 
adversely, it may choose not to do so because these actions have large indirect costs, and if it does 
so, these actions may not hurt the other party because it may anticipate such actions. 
Consequently, the nature of the impact of conflicts of interest on the customers of financial 
institutions is an empirical issue. 
Information plays a critical role in transactions involving financial institutions. In many 
transactions, financial institutions are better informed than their customers. Such information 
asymmetries are a fertile ground for conflicts of interest. Whenever two parties transact, each 
party wants to maximize its gain from the transaction. Each party takes into account the 
incentives of the other party and is aware that the other party enters the transaction to profit from 
it. When both parties have full information about the attributes of the good being transacted, 
when that information is fully verifiable, and when contracting is costless, no party has incentives 
to take actions that adversely affect the other party because the buyer receives exactly what she 
pays for. For instance, if one party buys a gold bar from another party, it is easy for the buyer to 
verify that she is receiving gold. There is a liquid market for gold which facilitates agreement of 
the parties on a price. Once the gold is acquired, its value does not depend on actions of the seller.  
In the absence of full information, verifiability, and costless contracting, conflicts of interest 
are omnipresent in economic transactions because the buyer may not be able to observe the 
quality of the good purchased, the seller may affect the quality of the good in ways that are not 
observable by the buyer, and the buyer may not be able to prove that the seller did so. However, 
as long as the parties to a transaction form their expectations rationally, there is no reason for the 
buyer to be victimized by the fact that the seller’s objective is to benefit as much as possible from 
the transaction. The buyer will only enter the transaction at a price that is advantageous enough to 
cover the risks associated with conflicts of interest. The seller bears the costs of conflicts of  
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interest and has incentives ex ante to reduce their incidence on the seller as long as it is cost-
effective to do so.  
In this paper, we assess the economic issues surrounding conflicts of interests within financial 
institutions, review the existing literature, and explain how the papers collected in this special 
issue improve our understanding of these issues. The papers in this issue are some of the papers 
presented at a conference jointly organized by the Dice Center for Research in Financial 
Economics at the Ohio State University, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Journal 
of Financial Economics in December 2004. There is a growing literature on conflicts of interest – 
on SSRN, 397 papers had “conflicts of interest” in the title or in the abstract as of July 2006. Our 
review is selective and should be viewed as such. It pays a lot more attention to the analyst 
conflicts of interest than to other conflicts because they have attracted the most attention from the 
public, from the regulators, and from academic researchers.
6  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we define conflicts of interest and 
provide examples of such conflicts in financial institutions. We then turn in Section 2 to the issue 
of why these conflicts exist. In Section 3, we discuss the mechanisms that moderate and control 
the adverse impact of these conflicts. We review in Section 4 the evidence on whether these 
conflicts affect customers of financial institutions adversely. In Section 5, we evaluate how recent 
changes in laws and regulations addressing these conflicts affect the welfare of customers of 
financial institutions and the efficiency of capital markets. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
1.  What forms do conflicts of interest take in financial institutions?   
 
As emphasized by Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (this issue), financial institutions have better 
information about the suitability of particular financial products for their customers than the 
customers have. Conflicts of interest naturally follow from the difficulties that the customers of 
                                                 
6 We focus on analysts only from the perspective of conflicts of interest. For a recent review of the analyst 
literature in general, see Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2006).  
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financial institutions have in ascertaining the quality of the advice given to them. Bolton, Freixas, 
and Shapiro analyze the situation where the customer cannot assess the accuracy of the advice 
received from a financial institution about whether a financial product is the most appropriate 
product for her. In such a situation, conflicts of interest could taint the advice. For instance, if the 
financial institution does not sell the product that is appropriate, but another institution does, its 
representative might lose a commission and the financial institution would lose the profits 
associated with the sale by recommending to the customer to go elsewhere. The representative 
may hence recommend a product that imperfectly suits the needs of the customer.   
Analyst forecasts and recommendations do not completely fit into that framework. 
Historically, the main consumers of analyst reports were institutional investors. Typically, 
institutional investors can assess the quality of an analyst report and could even produce the 
output they obtain from sell-side analysts if they had to. They rely on sell-side analysts because 
their product provides different perspectives and they do not pay for it directly. However, since 
the 1990s, some analyst output has become increasingly available to retail investors. With retail 
investors, information asymmetries are magnified – the typical retail investor could not write an 
analyst report on her own. This problem is aggravated by the fact that media outlets typically 
focus on selected information from reports and ignore the caveats. For instance, websites such as 
Yahoo! Finance freely make available stock recommendations from a large number of analysts. 
Further, while a report may have important and detailed information about potential conflicts of 
interest, such information does not fit in a 30-second summary by a journalist or interview of an 
analyst.   
Many observers have argued, at least before the recent reforms, that the advice of analysts 
was tainted when these analysts belonged to firms with investment banking operations or with 
brokerage operations.
7 It is claimed that by offering optimistic advice, analysts might have made 
                                                 
7 The following quote represents this view: “Ostensibly, the job of the analysts was to recommend what 
stocks investors should purchase. But throughout the 1990s, they gave credibility to the overvalued markets  
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it easier for investment bankers to develop and maintain profitable relationships with firms. 
Anecdotes that analysts issued buy recommendations on stocks that they sold from their personal 
trading accounts generated strong reactions in the press and the investing public. Though sales 
from personal accounts can be consistent with legitimate portfolio rebalancing needs or liquidity 
shocks, they can also be consistent with analysts disbelieving their own advice.  
Another conflict of interest for analysts arises from brokerage activities. A brokerage house 
benefits from more trading. If investors follow the recommendations of analysts, upgrades may 
be more likely to generate trading than downgrades when short-sales are expensive since, in that 
case, the investors most likely to trade on a downgrade are those who already hold the stock. 
Consequently, brokerage activities could make it advantageous for brokerage firms to produce 
more optimistic forecasts and recommendations for stocks that are costly to sell short.  
Brokers can also have conflicts of interest separate from analyst conflicts of interest. They 
may receive indirect compensation for directing customers to particular products. For instance, a 
mutual fund may direct trades to a broker because it is grateful for the broker’s sale of fund 
shares. This practice is known as directed brokerage.
8 The broker’s advice may be biased if it 
earns more by directing the investor to specific funds. The NASD has rules preventing brokers 
from taking into account commissions from portfolio transactions when making 
recommendations to investors.  
Conflicts of interest are not limited to advice given to investors. Conflicts involving 
investment managers and boards of mutual funds have been the subject of much attention as well. 
As explained by Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge (this issue), individual mutual funds are organized 
as separate corporate entities overseen by boards which have a fiduciary duty to the funds’ 
investors. The board of a mutual fund hires service providers, including most importantly the 
                                                                                                                                            
to millions of new investors, who were largely unaware that the analysts had taken on a more conflicted 
role of recommending stocks and helping their firms win the lucrative investment banking deals from the 
same companies that helped pay their outsized salaries.”, Gasparino (2005), p. 8.   
8 See Mahoney (2004).   
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investment manager. The investment manager’s contract is renewed yearly. For instance, FMR 
Co., better known as Fidelity, is the investment manager for Fidelity’s Magellan Fund. Magellan 
Fund is organized as a trust. One of its trustees is Edward Johnson, the chairman of FMR Co. 
Each trustee of Magellan is also a trustee on approximately 330 funds managed by Fidelity. 
Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge point out that it is extremely unusual for the board of a mutual fund 
to fire the investment manager and replace him or her by the investment manager of a different 
family of funds.  
The relationship of the board members with the investment manager may therefore trump 
their fiduciary duty to the investors in the fund, so that board members might be reluctant to take 
action against a poor-performing investment manager. Board members who work for the 
investment adviser would seem especially conflicted. In some situations, the investment manager 
might even take actions that are detrimental to the funds’ shareholders but beneficial to the 
management company. For instance, Mahoney (2004) cites the case of Invesco funds where the 
fund complex apparently agreed that some investors could enter market timing trades over the 
objections of individual fund managers who viewed these trades as detrimental to the 
performance of the funds. Also, the investment manager might vote the shares of the funds it 
manages to support management-initiated proposals that may be adverse to the interests of 
shareholders to curry favor with management because they provide profitable services to 
management’s firm, such as managing the firm’s 401(k) plan. The co-existence of asset 
management activities and underwriting leads to a conflict of interest as well. An underwriter 
could use its managed funds as a dumping ground for newly issued securities that are hard to 
place. 
Conflicts of interest also exist when commercial banks act as underwriters. A bank could 
benefit from helping a borrower to sell securities to repay its loans. Claims that conflicts of 
interest led bank underwriters to sell bonds to the public from companies that they knew to be 
weak led to the famous Pecora hearings and to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The Gramm- 
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Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 essentially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, so that banks can 
again compete fully with investment banks for underwriting mandates and again face 
underwriting conflicts of interest.  
The Global Settlement attempted to restrict the practice of spinning, where individuals from 
institutions with investment banking activities would give shares in an IPO to executives who 
might hire the underwriter later on. These shares would gain in value on the first day and the 
beneficiaries of spinning would make a quick gain by selling them. More generally, large first-
day gains make IPO allocations valuable and the underwriter could have incentives to use these 
allocations to its own benefit. The large first-day gains for IPOs raise the question of why the 
underwriter did not increase the offering price, so that the issuing firm would receive larger 
proceeds from the IPO. The finance literature suggests, among other explanations, that large first-
day gains may be advantageous to the issuing firm as a way to signal its quality so that it can sell 
shares subsequently at a higher price.
9 However, this issue is controversial. The traditional 
economic explanations for IPO underpricing seemed much more convincing before underpricing 
became extremely large as the NASDAQ index approached its peak. New explanations have 
emerged in response to these extremely large first-day returns, including behavioral explanations 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2002) and agency explanations (for instance, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2003).  
Some argue that the high return of IPO stocks on the day of the offering in the late 1990s and 
early in 2000 were partly the result of underwriter conflicts of interest. It is claimed that 
underwriters would have found it advantageous to generate excitement for new issues because 
doing so would have increased subsequent equity issues and trading income, presumably at the 
expense of investors who bought the issues in the after-market.
10 This argument raises the 
question of why underwriters find this advantageous or why they are only able to proceed this 
                                                 
9 See Ritter and Welch (2002) for a survey of the IPO literature.  
10 See, for instance, Aggarwal, Purnanandam, and Wu (2005).  
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way episodically. Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (this issue) examine the trading of IPO stocks on 
the first day. Using a proprietary dataset, they find that between 1997 and 2002 about one fifth of 
the purchases but a much smaller fraction of the sales go through the lead underwriter on the day 
of the IPO. The authors argue that their evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that investors 
buy through the lead underwriter in exchange for or on the expectation of favorable IPO 
allocations. One would expect, however, that investors who do more business with the lead 
underwriter are more likely to buy on the day of the IPO since the whole organization of the lead 
underwriter will be excited about the IPO and tout the stock. The authors investigate some 
reasons that investors have to direct more trades towards the lead underwriter on the day of the 
IPO and conclude that these reasons cannot explain their results.   
 
2.  Why do financial institutions engage in activities that lead to conflicts of interest? 
 
Conflicts of interest lead rational customers to discount the price they are willing to pay in 
transactions with financial institutions if they believe that they will be adversely affected by these 
conflicts. Consequently, conflicts have costs for financial institutions if they fail to control them 
well. Financial institutions could eliminate many conflicts of interest by becoming specialized. 
For instance, a firm could insure that conflicts of interest created by investment banking activities 
do not affect its research by choosing not to have such activities. This is not the model that most 
financial institutions have pursued. In fact, firms that were specialized have tried to expand their 
scope of activities. To the extent that controlling conflicts of interest is expensive, financial 
institutions must be willing to enter in activities which lead to such conflicts because there are 
gains from doing so that cannot be captured by specialized financial institutions. In this section, 
we therefore consider whether there is evidence of benefits to financial institutions from activities 
that lead to conflicts of interest. Competition may force financial institutions to pass on these 
benefits to their customers.   
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If financial institutions were solely run for the benefit of their shareholders, one would have 
to conclude that conflicts of interest persist in financial institutions because shareholders are 
better off when conflicts exist than when they do not. A complicating factor is that those who lead 
financial institutions have conflicts of interest also. They manage these institutions to make 
themselves better off. When corporate governance works well, executives have strong incentives 
to devote their efforts to increasing shareholder wealth. However, corporate governance does not 
always work so well that one cannot exclude the possibility that managers may take actions that 
benefit them at the expense of shareholders. For instance, managers might value investment 
banking operations despite the conflicts of interest these operations create because they enhance 
their prestige rather than because they create wealth for shareholders.  
To complicate matters further, financial institutions are regulated. Regulation can make it 
harder for institutions to enter or exit various businesses. Further, the regulated nature of financial 
institutions can make size advantageous for shareholders even when it would not be for 
comparable unregulated institutions. In banking, for instance, it is at times argued that large banks 
are more likely than small banks to be helped by the government if things go wrong, so that by 
increasing their size, banks acquire a valuable put option from the government. 
The model of Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (this issue) predicts under which circumstances 
conflicts of interest have less of an impact for an integrated financial institution than for a 
specialized financial institution. The benefit of integration is that, if the financial institution offers 
many products, it is more likely to offer the product that is relevant for a particular customer. 
Consequently, the conflict of interest resulting from the fact that the institution makes more 
money by recommending its own products becomes less relevant. A one-stop financial institution 
would always have a product that meets the investor’s needs, so that it could recommend its 
product to the investor without facing a conflict of interest. Nevertheless, not all products might 
be equally profitable. In that case, the financial institution might prefer to recommend the more  
12 
profitable products. Hence, integrated banking, by itself, can only resolve the conflicts of interest 
when margins are similar across products.  
There is a considerable literature in corporate finance on whether corporate diversification 
creates value for shareholders. Typically, papers in this literature find that on average diversified 
firms are valued less than a portfolio of comparable specialized firms, a finding called the 
diversification discount, but authors disagree as to what it means.
11 In general, the papers in the 
corporate diversification literature exclude financial institutions from their samples because 
financial ratios and valuation metrics for banks are not directly comparable to financial ratios and 
valuation metrics for other firms, and because banks’ ability to diversify typically depends on the 
changing regulatory environment. Laeven and Levine (this issue) investigate whether there is a 
diversification discount for financial conglomerates using a sample of 43 countries. They pay 
careful attention to a number of issues that the literature has shown might bias estimates of the 
diversification discount or might alter its interpretation. They find that the Tobin’s q of financial 
conglomerates falls as their preferred measure of diversity (based on the composition of assets) 
increases, so that there is a diversification discount for financial conglomerates.  This result holds 
across the world but also on a U.S. sample. Based on their evidence, there is no reason to believe 
that, on average, financial institutions create value for their shareholders when they become more 
diversified. Event-study evidence on bank mergers in the U.S. is consistent with this conclusion 
(see, for instance, DeLong, 2001).    
Activities within financial institutions that create conflicts of interest could be profitable for 
them even though diversification does not seem to create shareholder wealth on average because 
diversification may have costs that offset these benefits. Financial institutions gain from activities 
that create conflicts of interest if they can re-use information obtained through one activity 
profitably in another activity. Underwriting due diligence is cheaper but also more effective for a 
                                                 
11 For early evidence on the diversification discount, see Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek 
(1995).  
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bank that has intimate knowledge of the issuer from a lending relationship. Several papers 
examine whether underwriters’ market share benefits from also making loans. Yasuda (2005) 
finds that bank relationships have a positive and significant effect on underwriter choice above 
and beyond the effect of the relationship on the fees paid by the issuer. Drucker and Puri (2005) 
show that concurrent lending to an equity issuer allows underwriters to build relationships and 
increases the probability of receiving future business. They also demonstrate that prior lending 
relationships are important determinants of the underwriter selection decision of equity issuers.  
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (this issue) find that lending relationships have an 
extremely significant impact on whether a borrower will obtain future loans from a financial 
conglomerate since the probability of a relationship lender providing a future loan is 40% in 
contrast with a probability of 3% for a non-relationship lender. They also find that, though a 
lending relationship affects the probability that a bank will be chosen as an underwriter, the effect 
is less important than the loan effect they document. Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) 
also provide evidence that a prior lending relationship increases a bank’s probability of being 
selected as an underwriter, but they show that prior underwriting relationships are more 
important.  
The re-usability of the information acquired by a bank as a lender when it underwrites the 
securities of the borrower has led to a large literature that examines whether borrowers benefit 
from issuing securities with a bank that lends to them. A number of papers show that joint 
production of lending and underwriting leads to a decrease in underwriting fees. Roten and 
Mullineaux (2002) conclude that bank underwriting leads to lower underwriting fees in the period 
1995-1998; Yasuda (2005) find a small reduction for the period 1993-1997. Narayanan, Rangan, 
and Rangan (2004) show that from 1994 to 1997 the underwriting spread for seasoned equity 
issues is lower when the lending bank is in the syndicate. Drucker and Puri (2005) demonstrate 
that issuers issue equity at lower cost when the underwriter is also lending to them.   
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Financial institutions can gain from diversification of activities that leads to analyst conflicts 
of interest even if these conflicts have deadweight costs. Suppose that analysts in a financial 
institution are unbiased, but outsiders do not know for sure. If these analysts belong to an 
organization with investment bankers, investors might be somewhat skeptical of their advice, 
inducing a cost to the financial institution from having both analysts and investment bankers. 
However, the institution also benefits from having both research and investment banking: both 
analysts and investment bankers have access to a flow of information that would not be available 
in a specialized firm. There is no a priori reason why the benefits of having both investment 
bankers and research would be smaller than the costs. 
Consider an analyst who is brought over the wall because of an ongoing deal.
12 The 
understanding of the firms involved in the deal that the analyst brings to the table can be valuable 
to the investment bankers. If the firm stopped making analyst forecasts and recommendations 
available to its customers, the investment bankers would have to find another way to acquire the 
information they receive from analysts. Doing so would not be straightforward unless the 
investment bankers hired analysts but did not allow them to give advice to the public.
13 This 
would increase the investment banking production costs of the financial institution and the advice 
that investment bankers would receive would most likely be less valuable if interaction with 
investors sharpens analysts’ understanding of firms and industries. By being brought over the 
wall, analysts garner information about firms they would not have otherwise. Though they cannot 
use that information to improve their immediate recommendations and forecasts directly, their 
better understanding should presumably improve their future performance. With these 
considerations, putting investment bankers and analysts under the same roof can be valuable to a 
financial institution and might enable it to hire better analysts and investment bankers. It is 
                                                 
12 Underwriting activities and research activities are supposed to be separated by a “Chinese wall”. An 
analyst is brought over the wall when he participates in underwriting activities. For an analyst’s perspective 
on being brought over the wall, see Reingold and Reingold (2006). 
13 Hiring outside consultants would have a host of problems since secrecy is often extremely important in 
investment banking transactions.  
15 
certainly possible in theory that the consumers of analyst services receive a better product from 
analysts subject to an investment banking conflict of interest than from independent analysts.  
There is clear evidence in the literature that firms shopping for an underwriter care about 
analysts associated with the investment banks that they consider, so that joint production of 
investment banking services and research can increase the demand for investment banking 
services. Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) surveyed firms that switched lead underwriters 
after the IPO. They found that dissatisfaction with the provision of analyst services on their firm 
played a major role in their decision to switch. In their survey, 88% of the CFOs of switching 
firms listed a research reason as one of their top three reasons to switch. This does not mean that 
CFOs are looking for biased coverage. In the survey, they seemed more concerned with the 
frequency of coverage than with the nature of recommendations. The authors “conclude that 
issuers place value on incremental and perceived high-quality research coverage by sell-side 
analysts. They allocate their resources, in the form of underwriting fees, to increase and improve 
this coverage.” (p. 278). Recent evidence by O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin (2005) is supportive of 
this conclusion. They show that underwriters initiate coverage faster than other firms and 
maintain it longer.  
The possibility that analysts who face conflicts of interest because of investment banking 
activities could actually produce better information than others has empirical support. However, 
the way financial economists have studied analyst output may limit the extent of supportive 
evidence. Financial economists (with some notable exceptions, such as Asquith, Mikhail, and Au, 
2005, who show that a measure of strength of arguments in an analyst’s report is significantly 
related to the stock-price reaction to the report) have typically focused on few dimensions of the 
output of analysts, namely earnings forecasts, growth forecasts, and recommendations. Yet, in 
many ways, the other components of analyst reports may often be more useful to institutional 
investors. In particular, institutional investors value an analyst’s industry knowledge more than  
16 
his stock selection ability or his earnings forecasts.
14 These harder-to-quantify components of 
analyst reports may also be the ones where the understanding of the firm and industry are the 
most valuable. Nevertheless, for earnings forecasts, growth forecasts, and recommendations, 
there is some evidence that analysts’ output is better along some dimensions because of their 
association with investment banking activities. For instance, Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau 
(2004) find that analysts from large investment banks tend to be more accurate in their earnings 
forecasts and less biased. Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2003) reveal that investment bank analysts are 
on average more accurate using forecasts from 1998 to 2001.  
 
3.  Factors that mitigate the adverse impact of conflicts of interests 
 
If buyers are rational, they will only pay a price for the good they purchase that insures that 
they will not be hurt by conflicts of interest. To increase the selling price when the price is 
discounted because the buyer believes that the seller may have taken actions that decrease the 
value of the transaction to the buyer, the seller has incentives to take steps to commit to reducing 
the impact of conflicts of interest.
15 For instance, the seller of a used car might offer a warranty. 
As is well-known, it is possible for conflicts of interest to prevent trade when the buyer believes 
that actions by the seller could effectively make the good purchased worthless and the seller 
cannot take actions to reduce the impact of conflicts of interest on the buyer.
16 Therefore, 
financial institutions benefit from taking actions that control the impact of conflicts of interest to 
customers, but even when these actions are imperfect, customers may not suffer from conflicts of 
interest when they rationally take into account their impact. 
                                                 
14 Table 1 in Bagnoli, Watts, and Zhang (2006) shows the ranking of the usefulness of analyst output 
dimensions from 1998 to 2003 by the voters in the Institutional Investor survey. Stock selection is the 
second attribute in 1998 and the fifth attribute in 1999. Stock selection falls in importance in that table, so 
that it is 11
th attribute in 2003. In all years, industry knowledge is valued more than stock selection.  
15 See Grossman (1981). 
16 See Akerlof (1970).  
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Let us go back to analyst conflicts of interest. Consider the hypothetical case where an 
analyst will always do and say anything to make an investment banking deal happen. By acting 
that way, he would lose credibility with investors, so that they would ignore his 
recommendations. As a result, his usefulness to the investment banking clients of his firm would 
disappear. This suggests that there is a real sense that, when conflicts of interest become extreme, 
they cannot have an impact on the customers of financial institutions. Of course, this mechanism 
would not work if customers systematically underestimate the adverse impact of conflicts, so that 
we will have to consider this possibility.    
To be credible, an analyst has to build a reputation of providing valuable information to 
investors. Jackson (2005) models reputation acquisition for analysts and shows that analysts 
acquire reputation with greater forecast accuracy. An analyst with greater reputation will be leery 
of tainting his advice and forecasts to help the investment bankers if they want to be helped that 
way. In the extreme case, if reputation is extremely valuable and is fragile, the analyst would 
always ignore pressures from investment bankers and always provide unbiased advice. With this 
reasoning, conflicts of interest would typically have a small enough impact that they would leave 
no significant traces in an analyst’s output as long as this analyst values his reputation 
sufficiently. An analyst who puts low value on his reputation might, however, choose to offer 
tainted advice even though it affects his reputation adversely when confronted with the possibility 
of a sufficiently valuable short-term payoff from offering such advice.  
Reputation reduces the impact of conflicts of interest, but at times reputation can be for sale. 
Conflicts of interest are likely to create the most problems when the benefits from not preserving 
one’s reputation are highest. These benefits may be more likely to occur in unusual periods that 
are not recognized as such – if a party to a transaction knows that it is advantageous for the other 
party to behave in a way that endangers its reputation, the benefit to that party from behaving that 
way will disappear since its actions will rationally be anticipated by the other party. For instance, 
if an analyst will be compensated for shading the truth, shading the truth may be more  
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advantageous when high valuations make underwriting more profitable and the analyst expects 
the high valuations to be temporary but investors do not. Hence, viewed from this perspective, it 
may make sense that conflicts of interest would be more of a concern in periods such as the one 
of the turn of the century, when valuations were extremely high. However, the dramatic increase 
in valuations of the 1990s was followed by a crash. It is a well-established tradition that crashes 
lead to intense searches for scapegoats. After all, that is how the Pecora hearings mentioned 
earlier came about.  
Fang and Yasuda (2006a) examine the role of reputation as a disciplinary mechanism. For the 
period 1983-2002, they find that All-American analysts do not see a degradation of their accuracy 
during hot markets whereas other analysts do. It may be that All-Star analysts are just superior 
and perform better in turbulent markets. However, the evidence is also consistent with them being 
able to resist pressures from conflicts of interest in hot markets better than other analysts, or that 
they face fewer such pressures.  
The labor market plays a role in reducing the impact of conflicts of interest. If analysts who 
have more accurate forecasts are better rewarded by the labor market, analysts’ incentives to be 
more accurate will limit the impact of conflicts of interest. Does accuracy pay for analysts? The 
literature provides some evidence that analysts who are less accurate are more likely to separate 
from their jobs. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999) show that an analyst is more likely to turn 
over if his accuracy declines relative to his peers, but the profitability of his recommendations 
does not matter. Hong and Kubik (2003) go one step further and investigate whether an analyst is 
more likely to move up or down, where a move up is one to a more prestigious firm. They find 
that more accurate analysts are more likely to move up. Controlling for accuracy, the analysts 
who issue more optimistic forecasts are more likely to move up. Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston 
(2006) show that the importance of accuracy for career outcomes is much more limited in recent 
years.   
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Analysts have a clear metric showing success in their profession, namely their rankings in the 
Institutional Investor annual poll. Reingold and Reingold (2006) show vividly the importance of 
this poll for analysts. The best an analyst can hope for is to be selected to the All-Star team.
17 
Analysts do not become All-Stars by offering tainted advice but by being helpful to institutional 
investor clients. Firms are eager to hire analysts who perform well in that poll. So, analysts who 
are also-ran are in danger of being replaced by analysts who do. An analyst’s ranking in the poll 
is a major determinant of his compensation.
18 Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2006) conclude 
that All-Star status appears to be the most important driver of career outcomes for analysts. 
Institutions advertise the success of their analysts in the poll. Analysts have repeated relationships 
with the voters in the poll, so that institutional investors effectively monitor the analysts. 
Typically, analysts visit the voters and talk to them constantly. If institutional investors were to 
discover that an analyst gave them bad information on purpose, the damage to the relationship 
would be immediate and long-lasting. Career concerns of analysts therefore naturally reduce the 
impact of conflicts of interests. It is interesting to note that Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau 
(2006) find that All-Star analysts do not change their recommendation levels for firms when they 
change jobs. Their result is consistent with analysts caring about their reputation sufficiently that 
they repel pressures from investment bankers – or alternatively that these pressures are often not 
there.  
The paper by Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (this issue) shows clearly that 
analysts are responsive to the demands of institutional investors. They investigate 
recommendations from 1994 to 2000. They find that recommendations relative to consensus are 
positively related to investment banking relationships and brokerage pressures, but negatively 
related to ownership by institutional shareholders. Further, they find evidence that earnings 
                                                 
17 Strictly speaking, Institutional Investor gives the title of All-American analyst.  
18 See Stickel (1992).    
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forecasts are more accurate for firms with more institutional ownership and that ratings following 
share price decreases are adjusted more quickly.   
We saw that there are conflicts of interest for mutual fund investment managers. Investment 
managers get judged and compensated for their performance as investment managers. When they 
are successful, the funds they manage increase and their compensation increases. The incentives 
of portfolio managers therefore naturally limit the impact of conflicts of interest. However, one 
might argue that regulations on the compensation of fund managers aggravate the impact of 
conflicts of interest. The regulations make it difficult to compensate mutual fund managers for 
their investment performance directly, so that they end up having compensation that is mostly 
sensitive to the size of the fund they manage.
19  
We have focused so far on mechanisms that provide incentives to individuals to avoid 
exploiting conflicts. However, financial institutions have incentives to control conflicts of interest 
as well. If an institution can convince customers that conflicts of interest will not affect its actions 
in a way that is costly to them, it will be able to sell its services and goods at a higher price. For 
instance, a financial institution can create wealth for its shareholders by developing a reputation 
for providing good advice. To the extent such a reputation is valuable, the institution would want 
to protect it. Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (this issue) use two reputational capital 
proxies for investment banking activities. Their first proxy is the share of the investment bank in 
equity underwriting; their second proxy is the loyalty of underwriting clients. They find that there 
is a negative relation between the optimism of analysts and the reputational capital of the 
financial institution as measured by their proxies. This result is consistent with the prediction that 
institutions with greater reputational capital control conflicts of interest better. 
Financial institutions also have incentives to develop a reputation in their certification role as 
underwriters. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) show how reputation enables investment banks to 
be credible certifiers. Puri (1999) develops a model where banks and investment banks 
                                                 
19 See Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003).  
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underwrite securities. In that model, banks face a conflict of interest when they underwrite a 
security issue by a firm to which they have lent money since they will gain from a successful 
security issue either by having the loans repaid or by having the loans become more secure. In her 
model, however, reputation concerns mitigate this conflict of interest: A bank would make a 
short-run profit by underwriting a bad firm, but it would cost it in the long run.  
Competition would also seem to play a role in controlling conflicts of interest, but this role is 
complex. For instance, an increase in competition in investment banking could lead investment 
bankers to put more pressure on analysts. At the same time, financial institutions compete on the 
value of their advice. If an institution gives bad advice on products or its analysts make poor 
forecasts, other institutions have an incentive to inform customers of these facts. New highly 
valuable businesses have been built to take advantage of situations where competitors had 
conflicts of interest. For instance, boutique merger advisory firms have succeeded in part because 
their advice is considered to be less conflicted since they do not have underwriting services to 
sell. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (this issue) argue that by providing credible information, a 
specialist financial institution can differentiate itself and acquire market share.   
The last important mechanism that controls conflicts of interest is the role of regulatory 
authorities and litigation. Regulatory actions can put an end to the career of an analyst. More 
generally, for jobs that require employees to hold a license, that license can be withdrawn. In 
addition, though, litigation can impose large costs on financial institutions. Should an institution 
damage customers because of conflicts of interests, if the judicial system worked well, the 
institution would have to make its customers whole, so that it would lose whatever benefits it 
derived from conflicts of interests, and the litigation costs would mean that it would lose more 
than these benefits. Of course, in practice, errors are possible, so that an institution might have to 
compensate customers for damages that do not exist or might not be held wholly accountable for 
damages it did inflict.  
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4.  Do conflicts of interests have an adverse impact on customers of financial 
institutions?  
 
Conflicts of interest could be acute but have limited or no adverse impact on the provision of 
services by financial institutions because of the forces we discussed that mitigate the impact of 
these conflicts. However, even when conflicts of interest do affect the provision of services, they 
may still not adversely affect the consumers of these services because customers take the conflicts 
into account. To make this point clear, consider the output of financial analysts. Labor market 
incentives could make the recommendations of an analyst unbiased. If an analyst’s 
recommendations are biased despite labor market incentives, the bias in his recommendations 
might have no impact on security prices because the capital markets discount them and might not 
affect the investment decisions of investors because they take the bias into account. Hence, 
researchers have investigated whether conflicts of interest have an adverse impact at two levels: 
first, on the actions of financial institutions, and second, on the outcomes for customers of these 
institutions. In this section, we review the literature which investigates the adverse impact of 
conflicts of interest. The literature that focuses on the impact of conflicts of interest on analysts 
and their customers is extremely large. To help the reader, we summarize the information 
contained in the papers from that literature we discuss in Table 1. The papers in that literature are 
divided into those papers that focus exclusively on how conflicts affects analyst forecasts and 
recommendations of analysts (Panel A) and those papers that consider how conflicts affect the 
returns of investors following analyst recommendations (Panel B).  
It has been believed for a long time that analysts are optimistic. For instance, Lloyd-Davies 
and Canes (1978) show that analysts tend to have more positive recommendations than negative 
ones and Fried and Givoly (1982) show that earnings forecasts are upward biased. Analyst 
optimism may simply reflect behavioral biases. In particular, Affleck-Graves, Davis, and 
Mendenhall (1990) provide evidence that individuals who have no reason to produce optimistic 
earnings forecasts do so when confronted with a time-series of earnings (they call this the  
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“judgmental heuristics” bias). Evidence by Willis (2001) and Groysberg, Healy, Chapman, and 
Gui (2005) showing that buy-side analysts also have optimistic forecasts would be consistent with 
this view. However, it is worth noting that the evidence on optimism of analyst forecasts is, to 
quote a review paper, “contextually defined and sample-period specific.”
20 In particular, it 
appears that the results of the literature are sensitive to the measure of earnings used – analysts 
may choose not to forecast some transitory components of actual earnings, so that they may 
appear to be overoptimistic if the components they do not forecast tend to be negative and are 
included in the earnings compared to the analyst forecasts.  
There is evidence that optimistic biases for earnings forecasts have fallen over time. Brown 
(2001) finds that median forecasts become slightly pessimistic over the period from 1984-1999. 
Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2006) attribute this evolution to conflicts of interest. They 
argue that in strong bull markets analysts might have incentives to have pessimistic earnings 
forecasts so that firms will be less likely to have negative earnings surprises since the market 
penalizes negative surprises strongly. In their paper, analysts became more pessimistic over time. 
However, despite becoming more pessimistic, analysts have become less likely to underpredict 
earnings by more than two cents. This result suggests that the whole distribution of earnings 
might have shifted, making it hard to evaluate the evolution of the distribution of forecasting 
mistakes.  
Even if analysts were really issuing over-optimistic advice, there is evidence that investors 
can interpret the relative information value of rankings. By giving high rankings, however, 
analysts may have decreased the information value of these rankings. In contrast, the information 
value of rankings seldom given may have increased. For instance, Lin and McNichols (1998) find 
that hold rankings from affiliated analysts are more informative than hold rankings from 
independent analysts for their sample period, plausibly because hold rankings from affiliated 
analysts are really sell rankings since these analysts appear to be extremely reluctant to give sell 
                                                 
20 See Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2006), p. 66.  
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rankings during their sample period. Interestingly, Fang and Yasuda (2006b) find that buy 
recommendations in general do not have information that is useful to investors in contrast to sell 
recommendations. However, further supporting the importance of reputation, they find that buy 
recommendations made by All-Star analysts are useful to investors. Evidence in Kadan, 
Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2006) seems to suggest that investors saw through the scaling of the 
ratings. They investigate an episode in which, in response or anticipation to regulatory changes, 
financial institutions made large changes to their rating systems to have more balance and to 
simplify them. They write that these changes amounted to “massive reclassification of 
outstanding recommendations,” yet the recommendations “did not elicit significant price or 
volume reactions”.     
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (this issue) attempt to determine who trades when analysts 
change recommendations. They investigate trade imbalance for shares on days when analysts 
make recommendations and separately measure imbalances for large and small trades. They find 
that large traders, which would be mostly institutional investors, buy more on strong buy 
recommendations but not on buy recommendations, and sell on hold recommendations. Though 
large traders seem to take into account the optimistic bias of analysts in their rankings, small 
traders do not. These traders buy both for strong buy and buy recommendations but, 
paradoxically, fail to react significantly to sell recommendations of All-Star analysts. These 
results suggests that more analysis is required to understand exactly why the small traders behave 
the way they do. 
There is a considerable literature that investigates the relation between the properties of 
analyst forecasts and recommendations and the investment banking activities of the firms they 
belong to. This literature has followed two different approaches and reaches somewhat different 
conclusions depending on the approach used. The first approach has been to use underwriting 
relationships to identify conflicts of interest, so that studies compare the recommendations and 
the properties of forecasts of analysts from an issuing firm’s underwriters to those of analysts  
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unaffiliated to the firm’s underwriters. Dugar and Nathan (1995) identify for a sample of 
companies the investment bank advising that company. For each analyst report produced by that 
investment bank, they identify a report produced by an analyst not associated with that bank. 
They find that the analysts from the firms’ investment banks have more optimistic earnings 
forecasts and investment recommendations, but an investor following the recommendations from 
these analysts would not perform worse and the market discounts their recommendations.   
Several papers examine analyst output following a securities offering. Lin and McNichols 
(1998) study forecasts and recommendations for firms with secondary equity issues. They find 
that analysts affiliated with lead underwriters have more optimistic recommendations and growth 
forecasts, but their earnings forecasts are not more optimistic than those of unaffiliated analysts. 
However, investors discount the recommendations of affiliated analysts and there is no difference 
in the performance of stocks after the recommendations. Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000) 
conclude that long-term earnings growth forecasts of affiliated analysts are more optimistic. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) examine IPOs and find that stocks highly recommended by 
affiliated analysts perform poorly. They also find that investors discount the recommendations of 
affiliated analysts, but in their case, investors do not recognize the full extent of the bias, so that 
they underperform by following the advice of affiliated analysts. McNichols, O’Brien, and 
Pamukcu (2006) replicate the Michaely and Womack study for the period from 1994 to 2001. 
They find, like Michaely and Womack, that investors discount affiliated recommendations, but in 
contrast to them, they find no evidence that the recommendations of affiliated analysts are less 
valuable. In contrast, Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2006) examine IPOs from 1999 to 2000 and 
find no evidence of a differential reaction between affiliated and unaffiliated analyst initiations 
once they control for recommendation characteristics and timing.  
The second approach uses a broader lens to identify conflicts and assumes that the very 
presence of investment banking and brokerage activities create conflicts. Generally, the authors 
following this approach do not find evidence of bias when they consider earnings forecasts. This  
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literature demonstrates that there is little relation between optimism in earnings forecasts from 
analysts of a financial institution and the importance of investment banking as a source of income 
for that institution. For instance, Agrawal and Chen (2004) find no evidence that the accuracy or 
bias in earnings forecasts are related to the importance of investment banking or brokerage 
activities as sources of revenues in a financial institution. However, they show that the relative 
optimism of long-term growth forecasts and the frequency of quarterly earnings forecast revisions 
are positively related to the importance of brokerage activities in a financial institution. Cowen, 
Groysberg, and Healy (2006), Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2003), and Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and 
Rau (2004) find no evidence that conflicts of interest from investment banking make analysts 
more optimistic or less precise.  
In a separate paper, Agrawal and Chen (2005) look at 110,000 recommendations issued by 
4,000 analysts from 1994 to 2003 using the same approach. They find that conflicts of interest, 
measured by the importance of investment banking income and brokerage income, are associated 
with more optimistic recommendations. When they examine the reactions to recommendation 
changes, they conclude that the capital markets discount this optimistic bias induced by conflicts 
of interest. In fact, this discounting even increased during the 1990s. In their sample, the 
investment performance of recommendations is not related to proxies for conflicts of interest.  
Irvine (2004) uses a dataset from the Toronto Stock Exchange which identifies the broker 
associated with every trade. He concludes that buy recommendations generate relatively more 
trading for the analyst’s brokerage firm, but forecast bias does not. Jackson (2005), in contrast, 
using Australian data, finds that optimistic analysts generate more trades for their brokerage firm, 
but high reputation analysts generate more trades too.  
Though it is often taken for granted that investment bankers pressure analysts when they can, 
the evidence that investment banking clients actually want biased research seems limited to 
anecdotes since academics have not been particularly successful in finding support for that view. 
Consequently, the result in the literature that affiliated analysts are not more biased may simply  
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be due to the possibility that the importance of investment banking pressures is overstated. 
Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) investigate specifically whether more biased research 
helps investment banks to obtain more underwriting mandates for the period from 1993 through 
2002. They could not find “evidence that aggressive analyst behavior increase their bank’s 
probability of winning an underwriting mandate.” They conclude that the main determinants of 
the lead-bank choice are prior underwriting relationships and lending relationships. Clarke, 
Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2006) also find no evidence that issuing optimistic earnings forecasts or 
recommendations affect investment banking deal flow. However, Ljungqvist, Marston, and 
Wilhelm (2005), show that providing coverage makes it more likely that a bank will be chosen as 
a co-manager. Further, aggressive recommendations seem to make it more likely that a bank will 
be chosen as co-manager for equity issues for which the lead-manager is a commercial bank but 
not when the lead manager is an investment bank. For debt issues, aggressive recommendations 
increase the likelihood of co-manager appointments regardless of the lead-manager’s identity.  
Overall, there is more evidence that recommendations are biased than evidence that earnings 
forecasts are biased by affiliated analysts. However, even for recommendations, the literature 
does not reach a consensus. Importantly, findings that analysts affiliated with underwriters are 
more optimistic are not, by themselves, evidence that this optimism occurs because of conflicts of 
interest. Other explanations are possible. For instance, such a finding could simply be evidence 
that selection biases are at work. Suppose that, for a given firm, some analysts are optimistic 
relative to the consensus and others are not. An underwriter would not be in a position to 
participate in an underwriting if its analyst following the issuing firm has a hold or sell 
recommendation on that firm. If an underwriter participates in an offering only if its analyst 
following the offering firm does not have a hold or sell rating on the firm, ex post analysts 
affiliated with underwriters will appear to be biased. Bajari and Krainer (2004) find that when 
selection biases are taken into account, conflicts of interest due to investment banking (defined 
more broadly than is typical) do not have a significant impact on analyst recommendations for  
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firms in the NASDAQ 100 from 1998 to 2003. Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006) find that 
analysts are generally too optimistic for firms that have high external net financing. Among the 
various plausible explanations for their finding, they suggest that firms choose to issue when 
analysts are optimistic about them. They find no evidence, however, that this optimism is 
somehow greater for affiliated analysts. However, it is important to note studies seem more likely 
to find such differences when they compare analyst forecasts and recommendations closer to the 
issuance date than the six-month window utilized by these authors.  
Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (this issue) compare the recommendation performance of 
analysts from firms with investment banking business to the recommendation performance of 
analysts from independent research firms from 1996 to 2003. They find that investors would have 
been better off by almost 8 percentage points annually (before transaction costs) when following 
the buy recommendations of the independent analysts. However, all the evidence of the authors 
for the better performance of independent analysts comes from the period after the peak of 
NASDAQ and for stocks with recommendations of buy or better. In contrast, investors would 
have done well to follow recommendations of hold or sell from analysts from investment banking 
firms. The evidence the authors present differs substantially between firms that issued equity 
either in an IPO or in a seasoned equity offering (SEO) and other firms. When the authors look at 
the whole sample of firms, there is no evidence that following the buy recommendations of 
analysts affiliated with investment banks would have led investors to have underperforming 
portfolios, but investors following sell recommendations by affiliated analysts would have had 
superior performance. In contrast, when the authors separate firms between those that issued 
equity and those that did not, they find evidence that following the buy recommendations of 
analysts affiliated with investment banks for issuing firms would have led to underperformance 
while following that of independent analysts for issuing firms would have led investors to earn 
positive abnormal returns. The authors interpret this evidence to be consistent with the view that 
analysts associated with investment banks were reluctant to lower their ratings when stocks fell  
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after the peak of NASDAQ because of conflicts of interest. At the same time, however, they 
correctly point out that their results may “reflect hindsight bias, rather than evidence of biased 
research”.  
Evidence of analysts keeping buy recommendations when stocks were collapsing is often 
viewed as proof that analysts allowed conflicts of interests to influence their judgments. Yet, in 
an efficient market, the fact that a stock’s price has fallen does not mean that it will keep falling. 
Hence, poor past returns do not justify a sell recommendation. Other explanations are also 
plausible. For instance, suppose that an analyst has a valuation model suggesting that a stock 
price should be $100 when the stock trades at $80. For the stock price to increase to $100, the 
market has to eventually agree with the analyst. Instead, the stock falls to $5. If, when the stock 
trades at $5, none of the variables that enter the analyst’s pricing model have changed, the analyst 
should view the stock as a bargain. An analyst who stays true to his valuation model would 
recommend the stock as a purchase as long as his model tells him that the stock is worth 
significantly more than $5. It does not logically follow, therefore, that an analyst who fails to 
change his recommendation as a stock price has fallen is providing misleading or fraudulent 
recommendations. It could also be that the price drop leads the analyst to revise his assumptions, 
but not sufficiently to change the recommendation. 
Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (this issue) find no evidence that investment 
banking conflicts of interest lead analysts to delay downgrades. In contrast, O’Brien, McNichols, 
and Lin (2005) argue that analysts associated with investment banks are slower to downgrade 
stocks. Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan also find this result when they do not control 
for institutional holdings for the firms followed by analysts. It seems then that whether one 
concludes that analysts affiliated with institutions with investment bank activities delay 
downgrades or not is sensitive to the variables one controls for. O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin 
argue that if a selection bias explains their results, the only reason issuers would prefer analysts 
who are slow to downgrade is “for the purpose of delaying the disclosure of negative information  
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to investors.” (p. 625). It could also be, however, that issuers prefer analysts who believe in their 
valuations strongly. Such analysts might be more likely to support a stock after an IPO if it is 
performing poorly. James and Karceski (2006) find evidence that affiliated analysts provide 
strong support for IPOs that perform poorly in the aftermarket. It does not seem unreasonable to 
think that such analysts might be less likely to change their opinion in the face of adverse stock 
returns. This explanation might seem even more likely after the peak of NASDAQ. It would not 
be surprising if investment banks were a magnet for analysts who thought that new technologies 
had changed the investment landscape dramatically.  
The evidence on analysts we have reviewed so far is mixed. We saw some reasons why it is 
so. There are also more technical reasons for why the evidence is so mixed. Studies typically use 
short sample periods. Yet, some studies discussed in this paper show that results that hold in one 
sample period may not hold in another one. While it may be that conflicts of interest have adverse 
effects in some periods but not in others, one also has to be concerned that period-specific results 
reflect selection biases or random variation that is poorly understood. Some authors include 
earnings announcement dates in their studies while others do not. Some authors do a better job at 
measuring earnings that correspond to earnings forecasted by analysts than others. The studies 
also use different databases. There are some concerns about the quality and integrity of the 
databases. Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2006) show that thousands of recommendations 
which were associated with the name of analysts in 2002 on I/B/E/S are now no longer associated 
with analyst names – i.e., they were made anonymous (the evidence of the authors suggest that 
analysts are most likely responsible for the anonymization). The recommendations that were 
made anonymous tend to be bolder and made by more senior analysts. These recommendations 
are associated with poor performance. Strikingly, those analysts whose recommendations were 
anonymized experienced better career outcomes than other analysts.  
The evidence on the adverse impact of conflicts of interest of banks acting as lenders and 
underwriters is unambiguous. Overall, there is a consensus in the literature that, on average, these  
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adverse impacts do not exist. Recent research has shown that the bonds underwritten by bank 
underwriters in the years before the Glass-Steagall Act performed as well, if not better, than the 
bonds underwritten by investment banks, so that the claims that bank underwriters took advantage 
of the public are not supported.
21 Puri (1994) shows that bank-underwritten bonds during that 
period had a lower mortality rate than bonds underwritten by investment banks. Kroszner and 
Rajan (1994) conclude that bank underwriting reduced the probability of default of a bond using a 
matched sample of bonds.  Further work on such conflicts of interest examines debt issues that 
took place as banks were again given the opportunity to underwrite some debt issues in the 1980s 
and in the 1990s before the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed. These studies find no evidence 
supportive of the view that possible conflicts of interest by commercial banks adversely affected 
investors. Hence, enabling banks to write loans as well as to underwrite securities does not have 
an adverse effect on bank customers or investors. 
  Davis and Kim (this issue) investigate how business ties between mutual fund investment 
managers and firms these managers invest in affect how the shares of these firms are voted by 
mutual fund managers. In the absence of conflicts of interest, one would expect the managers to 
vote the shares for proposals that increase the value of the firms since doing so improves their 
performance and makes the funds’ shareholders better off. However, if such proposals are 
objected to by the management of the firms, the fund managers may offend the management of 
the firms and lose business. For instance, if FMR handles all of the 401(k) business of a 
corporation, the management of that corporation might be upset if FMR votes shares against the 
management’s recommendation and it might retaliate by withdrawing the 401(k) business from 
FMR. Davis and Kim have an extremely large dataset of votes by mutual funds. They find that 
there is no relation between how likely an investment manager is to vote with the management of 
a company and the business ties of that company with the investment manager. However, when 
they look at the votes of funds across firms, they conclude that mutual funds associated with 
                                                 
21 Drucker and Puri (2006) review the literature on bank underwriters.  
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investment management companies with more business ties to corporations are more likely to 
vote with management overall. The pattern of votes is interesting because they seem to side with 
management especially when there is no clear evidence from finance that the measures being 
voted on have an effect on shareholder wealth.    
Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge (this issue) investigate how board characteristics affect the 
probability that a fund will merge with a fund from another fund family. They find that mergers 
of this type are more likely for underperforming funds. However, they also provide evidence that 
boards with more independent directors are more likely to approve such mergers. Strikingly, this 
effect is most pronounced when a board has only independent directors. The SEC has required 
75% independence, though this regulation has faced difficulties in the courts. Apparently, the 
presence of some non-independent directors can have a substantial effect on the decisions of a 
mutual fund board. Also finding similar results are Ding and Wermers (2005), who investigate 
how mutual fund performance is related to the composition of the mutual funds’ board. In their 
paper, the performance of a mutual fund increases with the number of independent directors on its 
board, and an underperforming manager is more likely to be replaced when the board has more 
independent directors. It is striking that mutual fund studies find stronger evidence of an 
association between board composition and performance than studies focuses on operating 
firms.
22 
There is no convincing evidence that underwriters choose to dump stocks they underwrite 
into funds that their firms manage. Though both Ritter and Zhang (2006) and Johnson and 
Marietta-Westberg (2005) show that funds managed by underwriting firms invest more in IPOs 
underwritten by their firm than in others, both papers have evidence against what the former 
authors call the “dumping” hypothesis. Most importantly, Johnson and Marietta-Westberg find 
evidence that funds affiliated with underwriting firms earn significantly higher returns than funds 
not affiliated with such firms. 
                                                 
22 See, for instance, Bhagat and Black (2002).  
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5.  Is there a role for law and regulation?   
 
If customers of financial institutions take into account the conflicts of interest appropriately, 
the costs of these conflicts will be born by the owners of financial institutions so that these 
institutions have incentives to invest in reducing the deadweight costs associated with these 
conflicts. It is possible, however, that laws and regulations can decrease these deadweight costs 
because competition among financial institutions could produce equilibria where these 
deadweight costs cannot be reduced further without coordination. For instance, in the vein of 
Stein (1989), one could think of an equilibrium where each institution pushes its analysts to be 
optimistic about investment banking clients. However, this optimism has no impact in 
equilibrium on investment banking market shares because everybody behaves in the same way 
and has no impact on customers of analyst services because they discount the advice they receive. 
Such an equilibrium would be inefficient and firms might not be able to reach an efficient 
equilibrium without coordination by regulators. 
A more thorny issue is that not all investors may be sufficiently rational or sufficiently 
informed to take into account the conflicts of interest of financial institutions in their investment 
decisions. Historically, the output of analysts was targeted to institutional investors who seem to 
be able to assess on their own the impact of conflicts of interest and to discipline analysts who 
stray. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (this issue) view their results as evidence that retail 
investors are not fully cognizant of the impact of conflicts of interest. Some might argue that 
legislation should protect small investors even more than it does. Such a view might be 
reasonable for a range of products. However, analyst conflicts of interest have been known about 
for a long time. Investors know that different analysts have different views. They can make their 
investment decisions accordingly. The efficiency of the stock market depends critically on 
investors having incentives to acquire and exploit information. If, to protect small investors, it is 
necessary to reduce the information produced by analysts and hence limit the information 
available in the markets, the net outcome of regulation may be a reduction in market efficiency.       
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Regulatory solutions impose costs on financial institutions.  As a result, while deadweight 
costs associated with conflicts of interest may decrease, they may be replaced with regulatory 
costs. Financial analysts have an important role to play in producing information about 
companies. Many regulatory changes have affected how they perform their job. When regulations 
increase the cost of producing analyst services, fewer analyst services are produced. With rational 
investors, less production of analyst services leads to a decrease in the efficiency of financial 
markets. Further, analyst services can reduce corporate agency costs, so that decreased production 
of these services can adversely affect valuations in the long-run and make it harder for companies 
to finance their growth.  
Several papers have attempted to identify the impact of regulatory changes on analyst 
coverage, bias, and precision. The Global Settlement imposed many changes on the signatory 
firms. It forced firms to “physically separate their research and investment banking departments 
to prevent the flow of information between the two groups…”. Such a requirement decreased the 
potential legitimate synergies between investment banking and research discussed earlier. Boni 
(2006) summarizes the changes in research for the 10 firms that were party to the Global 
Settlement as follows. First, these firms reduced their coverage (though some of this reduction 
may have come from delistings). In 2001, these financial institutions covered 996 companies. 
Two years later, this number fell to 800. Second, the analysts did not become less optimistic. 
Third, the stock-price impact of recommendation changes fell, so that analysts’ recommendations 
became less informative. This evidence suggests that the Global Settlement might have succeeded 
in making investors worse off and the capital markets less efficient. However, the Global 
Settlement has many different provisions, so some provisions might have a positive impact. 
Unfortunately, assessing the impact of the regulatory changes is complicated by the fact that not 
all authors reach the same conclusions. More data will probably be required before we can obtain 
a more definitive assessment of the impact of the regulatory changes. The samples used by 
authors in existing studies have at most slightly more than two years of data with all the important  
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new regulations in place. Some of the effects of these regulations may not be noticeable with such 
a short sample period.   
The first important regulatory change affecting analysts was the promulgation of Regulation 
Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which became effective on October 23, 2000. Reg FD prohibits firms 
from making selective disclosures. Its proponents argue that it leads to a level playing field 
among investors. To the extent that analysts receive valuable information as a result of ties of 
their financial institution with corporate clients, one would expect Reg FD to have made these 
relationships less useful. Mohanram and Sunder (2006) conclude that the forecasting accuracy of 
analysts who were more likely to have preferential access before Reg FD because of the financial 
institutions they belonged to declined. Gintschel and Markov (2004) have similar results. As 
banking corporate ties became less useful in producing information, corporate ties of financial 
intermediaries not affected by Reg FD should have become more valuable. Accordingly, Jorion, 
Liu, and Shi (2006) show that credit rating changes became more informative after Reg FD 
because credit rating agencies are not subject to Reg FD and hence can receive selective 
disclosures. More generally, authors investigating the impact of Reg FD find that analyst 
forecasts have become less precise (Aggrawal, Chadha, and Chen, 2004; Gintschel and Markov, 
2004), that analyst forecast dispersion has increased (Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong, 2003; 
Mohanram and Sunder, 2006), that disagreement among analysts has increased (Bailey, Li, Mao, 
and Zhong, 2003), that recommendation changes have less impact (Cornett, Teharanian, and 
Yalcin, 2005), and that analysts follow fewer firms (Mohanranm and Sunder, 2006). Gomes, 
Gorton, and Madureira (2006) conclude that by cutting off the selective disclosure channel Reg 
FD increased the cost of capital of small firms. However, not all the evidence is negative, as some 
authors show that information asymmetries around earnings announcements appear to have 
decreased after Reg FD (Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman, 2004) and that analysts 
invest more in the production of idiosyncratic information (Mohanram and Sunder, 2006; Bailey,  
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Li, Mao, and Zhong, 2003). Some authors also fail to find an impact of Reg FD on analyst 
forecast dispersion and on analyst forecast errors (Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang, 2003).  
In early 2002, the NYSE and the NASD approved rules that required research reports to 
include information on the distribution of recommendations of the issuing firms. Barber, Lehavy, 
and Trueman (this issue) find that the fraction of buy and strong buy recommendations peaks in 
2000 and decreases steadily from then on to the end of their sample period of June 2003. Barber, 
Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2006) investigate the evolution of the distribution of 
recommendations further. They find that the reduction in buys and strong buys is most 
pronounced in the second half of 2002. They argue that this pattern cannot be explained by the 
evolution of the economy but reflects instead the impact of the NYSE and NASD rules.  
Finally, Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2006) compare analyst output before the 
adoption of the regulations that were aimed at changing the conduct of research in financial firms 
to analyst output afterwards. The authors consider a pre-regulation period from November 2000 
to August 2002 and a post-regulation period from September 2002 to December 2004. They find 
that the odds of an analyst issuing an optimistic recommendation during the pre-regulation period 
increased by 38% for stocks that had undergone an IPO or SEO and an additional 10% if the 
analyst was an affiliated analyst. These effects effectively disappear in the post-regulation period. 
Focusing on IPO/SEO firms, they also show that the stock-price reactions to upgrades to buy or 
strong buy are stronger in the post-regulation period, but the stock-price reactions to downgrades 
to sell are weaker. They find that stock-price reactions to upgrades and downgrades are similar 
for affiliated and non-affiliated firms in the post-regulation period. Unusual among existing 
studies, they find no stock-price reactions to positive recommendations for IPO and SEO firms in 
the pre-regulation period for both affiliated and non-affiliated analysts. This evidence suggests 
that in the pre-regulation period they consider, the market discounted positive recommendations 
for these firms completely and did not think that, somehow, affiliated analysts were more biased  
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than non-affiliated analysts. It may be that their short pre-regulation period, starting after Reg FD, 
is unusual as it corresponds to a period of turmoil in the U.S. markets.     
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we define conflicts of interests generally as a situation where one party in a 
transaction could potentially make a gain by taking actions detrimental to the other party. 
Because taking advantage of conflicts of interest has indirect costs, for instance, reputation costs, 
it does not follow that the party will take these actions. It is also possible that the other party 
anticipates the actions taken, in which case it is not hurt by them. We show that there is a large 
and growing literature on the economics of conflicts of interests. The conclusions reached by this 
literature seem to depend on the type of conflict that is investigated as well as on the sample 
period. At one extreme, the literature on the conflicts of interest arising because banks underwrite 
securities for firms that have borrowed from them does not find evidence that this conflict has an 
adverse impact. At the other extreme, the literature seems to find that independent boards for 
mutual funds have value. In between, the literature on analysts finds a mix of results. Some 
authors interpret their results as evidence that conflicts of interest matter for their sample, but 
other authors reach opposite conclusions. It seems to us that a fair assessment of that literature is 
that the majority of the papers do not suggest that the analyst conflict of interest arising from 
investment banking activities had a systematic and persistent impact on the customers of analyst 
services.   
Overall, the academic literature on conflicts of interest, using large samples, reaches 
conclusions that are weaker and often more benign than the conclusions drawn by journalists and 
politicians. Such an outcome is not surprising because there are important factors that mitigate the 
impact of these conflicts of interest. First, financial institutions and individuals working for 
financial institutions have incentives to limit the impact of these conflicts. Second, investors have 
incentives to take into account conflicts of interest in their decisions and adjust recommendations  
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made to them for biases that might result from these conflicts. Nevertheless, the existence of 
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Table 1 
Papers on conflicted versus non-conflicted sell-side analysts 
The papers are sorted by the beginning of the sample period within each panel. Panel A lists the papers focused on the impact of conflicts of interest on forecasts 
and recommendations. Panel B lists the papers that draw conclusions on the impact of conflicts of interest on the stock return performance of recommendations 
or on the market’s reaction to forecasts and recommendations. The last column for both panels provides our assessment of whether the paper shows that the 
conflicts of interests afflicting sell-side analysts affect adversely the actions of analysts and/or investors. If a study considers only the impact of conflicts on 
actions of analysts, we indicate that the conflicts have adverse effects if analysts are shown to have biased forecasts and/or recommendations because of the 
conflicts.  If a study considers the impact of conflicts on analyst actions and on investors, we determine if the conflicts have adverse effects based on whether 
investors are affected adversely by the conflicts. If a study finds that analysts are biased because of conflicts but this has no impact on returns of investors, we 
therefore conclude that the conflicts have no adverse effects. Admittedly, this assessment involves an element of arbitrariness. The conclusions listed are those of 
the authors of the papers. The papers in bold are in this issue. 
 




Panel A: Conflicts of interest and biases in forecasts and recommendations 
1.  Bradshaw, Richardson, 
and Sloan (2006) 
1975-2000, I/B/E/S, First 
Call, SDC. 
Over-optimism in analysts’ earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and 
target prices are systematically related to net corporate financing activities. 
Over-optimism is greatest for firms issuing equity and debt and least for firms 
repurchasing equity and debt.  
Yes 
2.  Chan, Karceski, and 
Lakonishok (2006) 
1984-2004, I/B/E/S.  Analysts become more pessimistic over this sample period so that more firms 
have positive earnings surprises. The predisposition to positive surprises is more 
pronounced for firms that are potential investment banking clients and for 
analysts from firms with investment banking business.  
Yes 
3.  Clarke, Khorana, Patel, 
and Rau (2006) 
1988-1999, I/B/E/S, 
Institutional Investor, SDC.    
All-Star analysts switching investment banks do not change their optimism in 
earnings forecasts or recommendation when joining a new bank, even though 
their coverage decisions change. No evidence that issuing optimistic earnings 
forecasts or recommendations affects investment banking deal flow.  
No 
4.  Jackson (2005)  1992-2002, I/B/E/S, SDC, 
Australia Stock Exchange 
Transaction Data.  
Analysts can generate more trade for their brokerage firms by either being more 
optimistic or by acquiring a higher reputation through more accurate forecasts. 
Reputation is hence a mitigating force for conflicts of interests. 
No 
5.  Irvine (2004)  1993-1994, I/B/E/S, 
Toronto Stock Exchange 
Transaction Data. 
Buy recommendations generate more trading for the analyst's brokerage firm. 
Earnings forecast bias (forecast minus actual earnings) cannot generate more 
trades but forecasts that deviate more from the consensus can.  
Yes  
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6.  Ljungqvist, Marston, 
Starks, Wei, and Yan 
(this issue) 
1993-2000, I/B/E/S, 
Thomson 13F, SDC. 
Recommendations relative to consensus are positively related to investment 
banking relationships and brokerage pressures, but negatively related to 
ownership by institutional shareholders. Evidence that earnings forecasts 
are more accurate for firms with more institutional ownership and that 
ratings following share price decreases occur more quickly.   
No 
7.  Ljungqvist, Marston, 
and Wilhelm (2005) 
1993-2002, I/B/E/S, SDC, 
LPC.   
Optimistic research attracts co-underwriter management appointments during 
the sample period. Co-management appointments, in turn, increase a bank’s 
chances of winning more lucrative lead-management mandates in the future.  
Yes 
8.  Ljungqvist, Marston, 
and Wilhelm (2006) 
1993-2002, I/B/E/S, SDC, 
LPC.   
No evidence that aggressively optimistic analyst recommendations increased 
their bank's probability of winning an underwriting mandate. Main determinant 
of lead-bank choice is strength of prior underwriting and lending relationships. 
No 
9.  O'Brien, McNichols, 
and Lin (2005) 
1994-2001, First Call, SDC.  Affiliated analysts downgrade their recommendations from a buy rating more 
slowly than unaffiliated analysts subsequent to equity offerings.  
Yes 




1994-2001, I/B/E/S, SDC 
New Issues, TAQ.  
Large traders react to strong buy recommendations, but not to buy 
recommendations. They sell on hold recommendations. Small traders take 
recommendations literally. Moreover, only large traders discount affiliated 
recommendations more than unaffiliated ones. It appears that small 
investors fail to adjust rationally for the incentive distortions of analysts. 
Yes 
11.  Agrawal and Chen 
(2004) 
 
1994-2003, I/B/E/S, x-17a-5 
SEC Filings. 
Accuracy and bias in quarterly forecasts are unrelated to conflict magnitudes, 
proxied by the analysts’ employers’ annual revenue breakdown among 
investment banking, brokerage, and other businesses. Relative optimism in LTG 
forecasts is positively related to the importance of brokerage business. 
No 
12.  James and Karceski 
(2006) 
1996-2000, First Call, SDC.  IPO firms with poor aftermarket performance are given higher target prices and 
strong buy recommendations especially from affiliated analysts. This typically 
lasts for less than six months and shows that affiliated analysts provide ‘‘booster 
shots’’ of stronger coverage for poor-performing firms. 
Yes 
13.  Cowen, Groysberg, and 
Healy, (2006) 
1996-2002, First Call and 
I/B/E/S, SDC, Nelson’s 
Directory of Investment 
Research. 
Analysts at firms that funded research through underwriting and trading 
activities actually make less optimistic forecasts and recommendations than 
analysts at non-underwriting brokerage houses. Optimism is particularly low for 
bulge underwriter firm analysts, implying that firm reputation reduces research 
optimism. Analyst optimism is at least partially driven by trading incentives, not 
investment banking concerns.  
No  
47 




14.  Jacob, Rock, and Weber 
(2003) 
1998-2001, I/B/E/S, 
Nelson’s Directory of 
Investment Research.  
Forecasts of quarterly earnings, annual earnings, and long-term growth by 
investment bank analysts are more accurate and less optimistic than those from 
analysts employed by independent research firms. Higher skill levels and better 
resources at investment banks dominate any alleged conflicts of interest. 
No 
15.  Bajari and Krainer 
(2004) 
1998-2003, Nasdaq-100 
index firms, First Call, 
SDC. 
Using a new approach that allows for peer group effects, they show that 
recommendations depend most heavily on publicly observable information 
about the stocks and on industry norms, and not on the existence of an 
investment banking deal. 
No 
 
Panel B: Studies of the stock performance of firms following analyst forecasts and recommendations 
16.  Dechow, Hutton, and 
Sloan (2000) 
1981-1990, I/B/E/S, SDC.    Affiliated analysts issue more optimistic long-term growth forecasts around 
equity offerings for a sample of 1,179 equity offerings. Post-offering 
underperformance is most pronounced for firms with the highest growth 
forecasts made by affiliated analysts.  
Yes 
17.  Dugar and Nathan 
(1995) 
1983-1988, Corporate and 
Industry Research Reports  
and Investext, Corporate 
Finance Bluebook. 
Analysts from firms’ investment banks issue more optimistic earnings forecasts 
and stock recommendations. An investor following the recommendations from 
these analysts does not have worse performance because the market discounts 
these recommendations. 
No 
18.  Lin and McNichols 
(1998) 
1989-1994, I/B/E/S, SDC.  Evidence of a greater degree of optimism in affiliated sell-side analysts’ long-
term growth forecasts and investment recommendations for stocks with 
seasoned offerings, but no such evidence for one- or two-year-ahead earnings 
forecasts. Hold recommendations from affiliated analysts are more informative 
than holds from independent analysts, showing that investors treat affiliated 
analysts holds as sells.  
No 
19.  Michaely and Womack 
(1999) 
1990-1991, First Call, 
Investment Dealer’s Digest. 
Affiliated analysts buy recommendations perform more poorly than those of 
unaffiliated analysts for a sample of 391 IPOs. Investors partially discount the 
recommendations by affiliated analysts and do not react as much to buy 




20.  Clarke, Khorana, Patel, 
and Rau (2004) 
1993-2002, I/B/E/S, 
Nelson’s Directory of 
Investment Research. 
Analysts at large investment banks provide less optimistic and more accurate 
earnings forecasts, and are more likely to provide the first forecast for a firm in 
any given quarter. Abnormal returns following recommendations from these 
large investment banks are also higher than those from other financial 
institutions. Analysts do not change their optimism when moving to large 
investment banks.  
No 





During the market downturn, analysts ranked by Institutional Investor from top-
tier investment banks are quicker to downgrade their buy recommendations 
compared to their unranked colleagues. Ranked analysts have more profitable 
stock recommendations. Personal reputation plays a disciplinary role in the face 
of conflicts of interest in sell-side research.   
No 
22.  McNichols, O’Brien, 
and Pamukcu (2006) 
1994-2001, First Call, SDC.  No evidence that affiliated analyst recommendations earn lower abnormal buy-
and-hold returns than those of unaffiliated analysts after the recommendations. 
Unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations usually arrive too late to discriminate 
between good and bad IPOs.  
No 





Investors can profit from following the buy recommendations of All-Star 
analysts from top-tier (reputable) banks while buys from other analyst 
subgroups are not profitable. Further, recommendations of All-Star analysts at 
top-tier banks remain valuable during the market troughs. Therefore, reputation 
exerts a mitigating role for conflicts of interest.   
No 
24.  Agrawal and Chen 
(2005) 
 
1994-2003, I/B/E/S, x-17a-5 
SEC Filings. 
Using revenue breakdowns as proxies for conflicts of interests, they find that 
the optimistic recommendation bias stemming from investment banking 
conflicts is especially pronounced during the late-1990s. Reactions to 
recommendation changes show that capital markets discount this optimistic 
bias. The one-year return of revised recommendations is unrelated to conflicts 
of interest. 
No 
25.  Barber, Lehavy, and 
Trueman (this issue)  
1996-2003, First Call, 
SDC, Nelson’s Directory 
of Investment Research.  
The average abnormal return to independent research firms’ buy 
recommendations exceeds that of investment bank buy recommendations 
by 8% per year. This underperformance is more pronounced after the 
market peak in March 2000 and for firms that recently issued equity. Sell 
recommendations have the reverse result—investment banks issue more 
profitable sell recommendations than independent research firms.  
Yes 
26.  Groysberg, Healy, 
Chapman, and Gui 
(2005) 
1997-2004, Anonymous 
buy-side firm, I/B/E/S. 
Buy-side analysts make more optimistic and less accurate earnings forecasts 
than sell-side analysts. Buy-side analysts’ buy and strong buy recommendations 
were less profitable than those of sell-side analysts.  
No  
49 
27.  Boni (2006)  1999-2004, I/B/E/S.  After the Global Research Analyst Settlement, the involved banks reduced their 
coverage of firms, continued to be optimistic, and issued recommendations 
changes that have lower price impacts. The Settlement seems to have done little 
to change the recommendations made by the ten Ssettlement banks or the long-
term investment value of their recommendations for investors. Also, naïve 
investors who trade on the level of analyst recommendations can be adversely 
impacted both pre- and post-Settlement. 
Yes 
28.  Kadan, Madureira, 
Wang, and Zach (2006) 
2000-2004, I/B/E/S, SDC.   The odds of an analyst issuing an optimistic recommendation during the pre-
regulation period (Nov 2000-Aug 2002) increased by 38% for stocks that have 
undergone an IPO or SEO and an additional 10% if the analyst is an affiliated 
analyst. Effects disappear in the post-regulation period (Sep 2002-Dec 2004). 
Price reactions to upgrades to buy are stronger in the post-regulation period for 
IPO/SEO firms, but the stock-price reactions to downgrades to sell are weaker. 
Stock-price reactions to upgrades and downgrades are similar for affiliated and 
non-affiliated firm in the post-regulation period. 
Yes 
 
 